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Andrew Heiss
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aheiss@gsu.edu
State restrictions on non-governmental organizations (NGOs) have become increas-
ingly pervasive across the globe. While this crackdown has been shown to have a neg-
ative impact on public funding flows, we know little about how it impacts private phi-
lanthropy. How does information about crackdown abroad, as well as organizational
attributes of nonprofits affect individual donors’willingness to donate internationally?
Using a survey experiment, we find that learning about repressive NGO environments
increases generosity in that already-likely donors are willing to donate substantially
more to legally besieged nonprofits. This generosity persists when mediated by two
organizational-level heuristics: NGO issue areas andmain funding sources. We discuss
the implications of our results on how nonprofits can use different framing appeals to
increase fundraising at a timewhen traditional public donor funding to such organiza-
tions is decreasing.
*We thank Mark Buntaine, Michael DeCrescenzo, Jeffrey Friedman, Thomas Leeper, and Tristan
Mahr for their helpful comments and input, as well as the anonymous reviewers at Nonprofit and
Voluntary Sector Quarterly (NVSQ) for their excellent feedback. We also thank Samantha Camilletti
and Joshua Dutro for their excellent research assistance. This experiment received approval by the
human subjects research committees at both Christopher Newport University (018.042) and Brigham
Young University (E18104). We preregistered our hypotheses and research design at the Open Science
Framework, and our preregistration protocol is available at https://osf.io/dx973/.
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Over the last three decades, governments across the world have sought to limit
thework of nonprofits and nongovernmental organizations (NGOs)—a phenomenon
known as “closing civic space” (Carothers, 2015; Dupuy et al., 2016). Repressive gov-
ernments have enacted laws creating barriers to advocacy and funding for a variety
of NGOs. The adverse effects of these laws are particularly felt in countries with
weak institutions and poor governance. International donors directing aid to these
countries typically seek out NGOs to implement their projects, as direct aid trans-
fers to recipient governments pose the risk of misuse and bureaucratic inefficiency
(Dietrich, 2013). However, official aid flows to NGOs have decreased considerably
in countries that repress NGOs (Brechenmacher, 2017; Chaudhry & Heiss, 2018;
Dupuy & Prakash, 2018). While we know there has been a negative impact on
funding from official donors, we know relatively little about how this crackdown
affects private donors, in particular how it influences individual donors’ willingness
to donate internationally.
Charitable giving to nonprofits working in international affairs has steadily in-
creased over the past two decades.1 From 2014–2016, giving to international affairs-
focused issues increased by 14.1% (IUPUI Lilly Family School of Philanthropy, 2017).
This amount is not insignificant—by 2016, total private giving to nonprofits working
in international affairs had increased to $22.03 billion (Giving USA, 2017). Most no-
tably, a large portion of this growth was driven by individuals making small-scale
donations. In 2017, individuals gave $286.7 billion, or approximately 70% of total
giving to international affairs. This further increased to $427.71 billion in 2018, 85.7%
of which was through individuals (Giving USA, 2019). While much is known about
individuals’ motivations for giving locally (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011), much less
is known about motivations to give internationally. These large amounts show the
urgency of understanding this phenomenon. What factors affect individual donor
preferences on giving to international causes? How does information about repres-
sive NGO environments abroad affect donors’ willingness to donate internationally,
and how does knowledge of legal crackdown interact with other organizational at-
tributes?
Given information asymmetry and time constraints, individual donors often use
heuristics to simply their decision-making (Croson & Shang, 2011; Tremblay-Boire
& Prakash, 2017). Framing, or the process through which actors present informa-
tion to influence perceptions of behavior, is particularly important in this regard
(Chong & Druckman, 2007), as NGOs’ appeals for donations are framed by struc-
tural and organizational characteristics. We use a survey experiment fielded in
1. According to Giving USA, the category of “international affairs” includes nonprofits working in
international development, international relief services, disaster relief, international human rights,
international peace and security, foreign policy research and analysis, and international exchange
programs.
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the U.S. to assess how different structural and organizational-level heuristics affect
donor preferences. We find that learning about repressive NGO environments in-
creases generosity and that already-likely donors are willing to donate substantially
more to legally restricted nonprofits.
This generosity persists when mediated by two important organization-level
heuristics: issue area and funding source. Learning about crackdown increases
individuals’ willingness to donate to privately funded nonprofits. This may be be-
cause the survival of the NGO appears to be in question and the donor’s assessment
might be that their donation actually makes a difference. These results are particu-
larly substantive for privately-funded human rights NGOs facing crackdown, with
donors showing an increased willingness to not just donate to them, but also to do-
nate more to them. While not unsurprising, this does suggest that private donors
to human rights NGOs likely know that their work is always challenging to host
governments, and that such organizations need greater support when facing hostile
environments.
Our study makes a significant contribution to research on individual giving and
indicates the promise and limits of different framing appeals on individual donor
preferences. While factors shaping individual giving to domestic causes have been
thoroughly explored in existing literature, the dynamics of international giving are
less explored.2 Understanding the latter is important as philanthropy to interna-
tional causes can be harder to motivate because the number of recipients is larger
and further removed from the donor (Casale & Baumann, 2015, p. 100).
Second, most nonprofits working internationally have traditionally relied on
government and foundation funding. In the era of closing civic space, NGOs may
need to reframe and tailor their fundraising strategies to individual donors. How-
ever, we lack systematic studies of which frames may be effective when making
appeals to donors considering international philanthropy. Our study examines the
impact of political frames such as regulatory crackdown, and how this frame inter-
acts with organizational attributes to change donor preferences. Accordingly, our
results can help international nonprofits frame their appeals for funding, especially
when facing restricted legal space abroad.
Below, we summarize existing research on the determinants of giving to NGOs
and lay out our expectations regarding how crackdowns and NGO organizational
attributes individuals’ philanthropic preferences. We then describe our survey ex-
periment and present the results. We concludewith implications for NGOsworking
in repressive countries and lay out questions ripe for future research.
2. For exceptions, see Micklewright and Schnepf (2009) on the UK, Rajan et al. (2009) on Canada,
Wiepking and Bekkers (2010) on the Netherlands, and Casale and Baumann (2015) on the USA.
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Philanthropy towards international NGOs
Thousands of international NGOs (INGOs) in the Global South receive funds from
a variety of public and private sources each year.3 Though we focus on private
funding in this article, it is essential to differentiate between the two sources. Pub-
lic aid, or more traditional donor aid, channels funds from official aid agencies to-
wards nonprofits through a variety of bilateral andmultilateral institutions. Private
funds come from foundations, corporations, and individuals. We are specifically in-
terested in individual-level determinants of private international philanthropy.
Nonprofits working internationally typically rely heavily on official aid from
government sources. In 2018, for instance, humanitarian INGOs received 81% of
their total funding from governments and EU institutions (Development Initia-
tives, 2020). However, private giving to nonprofits working in international af-
fairs has increased consistently over the past decade. Donations from individuals
have far outstripped foundation and corporate giving—in 2018, individual dona-
tions amounted to $292.09 billion, compared to $75.86 billion from foundations and
$20.05 billion by corporations. While foundations are often seen as the primary
funders of international nonprofits, they accounted for only 18% of all charitable
giving in 2018—and grants from the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation accounted
for more than half of all foundation giving (Giving USA, 2019). Moreover, while
government, foundation, and corporate funding is often earmarked for specific pur-
poses, private donations are typically unrestricted funds.4 Individual donors thus
play an incredibly important—and underexplored—role in funding international
NGOs.
Given these substantive amounts, understanding individual motivations to do-
nate internationally is important as individual donor preferences may not neces-
sarily mirror the preferences of official aid agencies. While there is evidence that
citizens generally support the goals of aid agencies (Milner & Tingley, 2010), sur-
veys show that the American public is notoriously misinformed about U.S. foreign
aid (Norris, 2019). Further, both foreign aid and democracy aid are often consid-
ered unresponsive to political developments in recipient countries (Carothers, 2015)
and public aid decisions—especially regarding final recipients and amounts—are
not easily accessible. There is also heterogeneity in how donor governments allo-
cate funds. For instance, unlike established donors such as the United States and
other Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) countries,
3.We use the terms nonprofit organizations and NGOs interchangeably. We consider international
NGOs to be nongovernmental organizations withmembers from two ormore countries and that work
in countries outside of their home country.
4.We thank an anonymous reviewer for this insight.
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emerging donor governments tend to demand fewer human rights, governance, or
environmental preconditions (Fengler & Kharas, 2010).
Recent experimental evidence also finds little support for the idea that individ-
ual donor behavior mimics that of official donors. Desai and Kharas (2018) find that
unlike official donors who tend to channel funds to countries with better institu-
tional quality or to reward governmental performance (Bermeo, 2011; Dietrich &
Wright, 2015), individual donors do not use the same performance-based metrics.
Rather, individuals are more inclined to donate to NGOs in countries experiencing
a humanitarian crisis—in particular, crises following natural disasters. Desai and
Kharas (2018) conclude that compared to donor agencies, “private donors respond
to different project and country characteristics” (p. 517). International philanthropy
by individuals should therefore be investigated on its own terms.
Looking at different funding flows, it is also notable that private funding towards
nonprofits working internationally appears to not be as adversely impacted as pub-
lic funding flows in the face of the global crackdown on NGOs. While anti-NGO re-
strictions have reduced official aid to repressive countries (Dupuy & Prakash, 2018),
private foundations have continued to channel funds to countries with unfriendly
legal environments (Foundation Center, 2018). Accordingly, it is imperative to un-
derstand whether individual donors mirror the trajectory of foundations when giv-
ing internationally, especially to organizations facing legal crackdown abroad.
Key drivers of individual-level philanthropy
Substantial research on charitable giving has looked at the motivations of individ-
ual donors (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011; Wiepking, 2010). However, research on
individual donor behavior has overwhelmingly examined giving to organizations
working locally, rather than internationally. This literature has primarily focused
on the importance of three main factors, especially when considering international
philanthropy: (1) the role of social and associational capital, (2) the role of individual
experiences such as higher education and levels of religiosity, and (3) third-party
certifications.
Prior research has found that those who participate in a variety of associations
and build social capital are more likely tomake charitable donations as well as make
larger donations (Hossain & Lamb, 2017). An individual’s social network also plays
an important in deciding to donate. Looking at relational configurations in social
networks, Herzog and Yang (2018) find that having both a giver and a solicitor in
one’s social network increased the likelihood of that individual’s charitable giving.
Individual experiences such as access to higher education and increased reli-
giosity can also influence giving (Wiepking & Bekkers, 2010). Higher education
fosters pro-social motivations and brings people into social networks that entail a
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higher level of solicitation (Bekkers & Wiepking, 2011). Education also increases
abstract thinking (Wiepking & Maas, 2009, p. 1978), which is important for donat-
ing to distant international relief organizations than donating to local, more visible
nonprofits (Micklewright & Schnepf, 2009). Overall, individuals with higher lev-
els of income, education, and greater religious proclivities have been shown to not
only be more likely to give internationally, but also to give higher amounts (Casale
& Baumann, 2015; Rajan et al., 2009).
Finally, information about organizational characteristics and third-party certifi-
cations can also impact levels of individual philanthropy, though results are mixed.
Existing research shows that information on the efficiency of NGOs merely steers
rather than encourages or discourages overall donations (Ryazanov & Christenfeld,
2018). The effects of changes in charity watchdog ratings and nonprofit account-
ability systems on individual donors is also mixed, showing that donors do not have
the time to research charities thoroughly (Bekkers, 2010) and that ratings by charity
watchdogs do not really affect donor support for these nonprofits (Szper & Prakash,
2011).
Even though these above factors affect individuals’ motivations to donate in-
ternationally, extant literature on international giving focuses on donating dur-
ing crises and emergencies. However, as Micklewright and Schnepf (2009) point
out, motivations for donating to ongoing international causes differ from donating
money to natural disasters or emergency international causes. Under ordinary cir-
cumstances, “donors are more likely to donate to a charity operating locally than
to a charity providing identical service abroad” (Tremblay-Boire & Prakash, 2017,
p. 644). However, we lack adequate data and theory regarding international phi-
lanthropy. Most research on individual donors to international causes has been
restricted to elite, high net-worth donors—those with more than $200,000 in an-
nual income or $1 million in assets (US Trust, 2014). However, given the increasing
funds channeled by individuals to international nonprofits, it is crucial to under-
stand what motivates these donors to donate.
Individuals rely on heuristics that differ from the benchmarks used by large gov-
ernmental agencies and private foundations. These signals, we argue, can be even
more important in giving to international causes. In theory, donors should scru-
tinize each aspect of an NGO’s organizational structure and programmatic per-
formance prior to donation, but this rarely happens in practice (Tremblay-Boire
& Prakash, 2017). Instead, donors respond to a host of heuristics when deciding
whether to donate to an NGO, since seeking complete information about an or-
ganization is costly and time-consuming. These heuristics are commonly rooted
in donor perceptions of organizational characteristics—donors make cursory judg-
ments about an organization’s issue area, mission, vision, and values, and seek out
supplementary information from friends, family, and acquaintances (Sloan, 2009;
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Szper & Prakash, 2011). Nonprofits fundraising internationally may therefore rely
on framing to control perceptions. Below, we theorize the effect of different frames
surrounding a country’s legal environment and nonprofit organizational character-
istics on individual donor preferences.
Theorizing the effects of structural and organizational frames on in-
dividual giving
We argue that structural factors—including whether an organization works abroad
and the domestic political environment of the group’s host country—can serve as
important heuristics in the decision to engage in philanthropy (Casale & Baumann,
2015; Knowles & Sullivan, 2017; Tremblay-Boire & Prakash, 2017). We propose
that the regulatory relationship between international NGOs and their host gov-
ernments serves one such heuristic. NGO legislation is not inherently restrictive,
and governments frequently use laws to regulate the behavior of NGOs (Blood-
good & Tremblay-Boire, 2016; DeMattee, 2018). Restrictive NGO laws, on the other
hand, are designed to limit organizational programming by imposing barriers to en-
try, funding, and advocacy (Spires, 2020). These stricter anti-NGO laws can signal
to donors that governments perceive these groups as threatening and may crack
down on them.
We argue that donors perceive legal crackdowns differently fromorganizational-
level heuristics—such as NGO missions and programming—because donors may be
able to influence these latter attributes, at least to some extent. Conversely, donors
can do little to change the domestic political environment of another country. Legal
crackdowns abroad can signal to donors that the government may eventually target
other NGOs as well, which can increase donor urgency to support legally besieged
groups, even if donors are not completely satisfied with some organizational-level
features of a group. As such, we expect that government restrictions abroad will
increase respondents’ likelihood of donating to the organization and increase the
amount donated.
H1a: If donors learn that NGOs face legal crackdowns abroad, then in-
dividual donors will be more likely to donate to them.
H1b: If donors learn that NGOs face legal crackdowns abroad, then in-
dividual donors will donate more to them.
Figure 1 represents this relationship formally. Legal crackdowns (C) have a di-
rect effect on donor decisions (Y; donation likelihood and amount) because of their
heuristic function. Legal crackdowns do not occur in isolation, however. Countries
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Figure 1: Causal diagram of the relationship of organizational and structural causes of donor preferences
are more likely to repress NGOs both when organizational issue areas (I) are in
tension with government preferences and when organizations receive substantial
funding (F) from abroad (Dupuy et al., 2015). Both of these organizational char-
acteristics thus confound the causal effect of crackdowns on donor decisions and
must be accounted for in the analysis—issue areas and funding sources simultane-
ously influence the likelihood of crackdown while also serving as organizational
heuristics that influence donor preferences.
The contentiousness of NGO issue areas—or the degree to which an NGO’s pro-
gramming is compatiblewith government preferences, can also serve as an organization-
level heuristic.5 NGOs that address humanitarian issues such as relief and devel-
opment have broader appeal to donors and these issues rarely challenge the gov-
ernment. Further, their programmatic output is easily quantifiable and donors can
see the results of their charity more readily (Bush, 2015). Previous research has
shown that public donors do indeed differentiate between NGO issue areas, espe-
cially when these organizations are working in repressive contexts. Donor agencies
in OECD countries respond to repressive NGO environments, especially those con-
taining barriers to advocacy, by decreasing funds for groups working on politically
sensitive causes such as anti-corruption initiatives, elections, human rights, legal
reform and security sector reform, and instead increase funding for groups working
on relatively tamer causes such as health, education and agriculture (Chaudhry &
Heiss, 2018).
Issue area contentiousness directly influences legal crackdowns, however, and
confounds the heuristic effect of crackdowns on donor behavior (see Figure 1).
5.While anti-NGO legislation can theoretically target all NGOswithin a state’s borders, in practice
these laws are enforced more selectively against contentious groups that pose threats to states (see
Chaudhry, 2016; Heiss, 2017).
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NGOs working on more contentious human rights issues can be challenging to
regimes (Heiss, 2017). These organizations are often viewed as politically motivated
outsiders and run a higher risk of getting expelled (Dupuy et al., 2015), increasing
the possibility of wasting donor resources. There is evidence that this a concern
for private donors. In a survey of women’s NGOs across the globe conducted by
Mama Cash and Urgent Action Fund, many groups argued that private donors (es-
pecially foundations) were withdrawing from funding sensitive issues in repressive
contexts, which in turn hurt women’s and trans rights organizations. Some private
funders, these groups argued, were also more likely to fund well-established groups
that were more likely to survive crackdown (Bishop, 2017).
However, compared to our existing knowledge on public donors and foundation
donors, we lack knowledge about how individuals respond to frames emphasizing
one nonprofit issue area over another, especially a contentious area over a tamer
one. NGOs working on tamer issues such as health, education, disaster relief, and
humanitarian aid can often frame their activities as in need of greater support. This
may strongly influence individual decisions to donate to relief efforts (Wiepking
& Bekkers, 2010). On the flip side, individual donors may believe that it is more
difficult to improve human rights in the host country and subsequently shy away
from donating to NGOs working on contentious causes.
As such, we hypothesize that donors will be more likely to donate to less con-
tentious NGOs because these are seen as uncontroversial, apolitical, directed to-
wards the most deserving of need, and are more capable of producing short-term
quantifiable results. We use humanitarian NGOs as a proxy for groups working on
non-contentious issues and human rights NGOs as a proxy for contentious issues.
H2a: If donors learn that legally besieged NGOs work on humanitarian
issues, then individual donors will be more likely to donate to them.
H2b: If donors learn that legally besieged NGOs work on humanitarian
issues, then individual donors will donate more to them.
The final heuristic we examine is the source of NGO funding. Government grants
to nonprofits can often crowd out private funding, though evidence is mixed on
whether this completely or partially crowds out private dollars (Heutel, 2014; Stein-
berg, 1991). Donors may feel less inclined to contribute to NGOs receiving funds
from agencies like the United States Agency for International Development (US-
AID) because such funding can signal a lack of independence from the government.
Organizations that receive substantial funding from their home governments fre-
quently avoid programming that would question the donor government even if
such programming is in line with their mission (Stroup, 2012; Yu et al., 2020). In
contrast, individual donors who see that organizations are privately funded may
1c86b49 on 2020-10-10
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feel that they can also contribute and help and that their marginal donation would
make a noticeable difference.
As funding restrictions are one of the most common forms of anti-NGO regu-
lations (Dupuy et al., 2015), organizational funding again confounds the effect of
anti-NGO crackdowns on donor behavior (see Figure 1). Accordingly, the combi-
nation of legal crackdown and funding may affect donor preferences. Individual
donors may be less likely to donate to government-funded NGOs that face restric-
tions, since theymay believe that legally besieged government-backedNGOswould
enjoy the backing of their home government when facing difficulties. Legal trouble
in the NGO’s host country could also indicate mistrust between the home and host
government—a dynamic that individuals may not wish to enter with their dollars.
Donors thus may be likely to donate more to NGOs that rely on private funding.
H3a: If donors learn that legally besieged NGOs receive substantial
funding from their home government, then individual donors will be
less likely to donate to them.
H3b: If donors learn that legally besieged NGOs receive substantial
funding from their home government, then individual donors will do-
nate less to them.
Importantly, when testing these hypotheses, we do not assume that individual
donors have perfect knowledge about an NGO or the country an NGO operates in.
Moreover, the average donor will not know exactly what “legal crackdown” entails
for any given organization (i.e. does it mean an NGO was expelled, or that its as-
sets were frozen, or that it received a fine?). For the sake of this experiment, this
ambiguity is not a central concern as the heuristics we explore here are explicitly
simplified shortcuts to donor information-gathering. Knowing that an organization
works on human rights issues (even if donors are not familiar with specific kinds
of rights), or knowing that an NGO faces legal trouble abroad should be enough
to trigger the effect of these frames on donor preferences. Moreover, while many
NGOs make information about their operations accessible through annual reports,
it is time-consuming to track down that information. In each of these hypotheses,
we assume that donors will not spend additional effort to research the exact details
concerning crackdown, issue area, and funding sources. Instead, donors rely on sig-
nals and heuristics about the organization to shape their preferences and behavior
(Szper & Prakash, 2011).
We also posit that these signals work interactively to shape donor preferences—
as seen in Figure 1, issue areas and funding sources each change the probability of
NGO crackdown and confound causal relationships. As such, the effect of crack-
down will be different depending on if an organization focuses on humanitarian
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assistance or human rights, or if it receives government funding or not. Accord-
ingly, we test nested versions of these hypotheses in our analysis. it is unclear a
priori what these interactive effects will be and which frames are more powerful
when nested, though in general we expect the nested hypotheses to have an addi-
tive effect (i.e. because crackdown and humanitarian assistance should each have a
positive effect on preferences on their own, the combination of the two will have a
larger positive effect).
Research design
To measure the effect of structural and organization-level heuristics on individual
donor preferences, we use an experiment to vary the different frames donors are
exposed to. Comparing these effects allows us to measure the relative strength of
these heuristics, and ultimately help NGOs tailor their fundraising strategies for
individuals. Prior to launching the experiment, we preregistered our hypotheses
and research design at the Open Science Framework, and our preregistration pro-
tocol is available at https://doi.org/10.17605/OSF.IO/DX973. The online appendix
also includes the full text of the survey experiment, as well as details about our
sample demographics, balance across experimental conditions, CONSORT diagram,
and Bayesian priors. The analysis is fully reproducible using code and data avail-
able at https://doi.org/10.5281/zenodo.4058986 and https://dx.doi.org/10.17605/OSF.
IO/FG53W.
Sample
We test these hypotheses with a vignette-based survey experiment fielded through
Amazon’s Mechanical Turk.6 Our target population is the portion of Americans
hypothetically willing to donate money for human rights and humanitarian work
abroad. Our convenience sample (March 2018, N = 531) generally approximates
the characteristics of our target population, since it is younger, more educated,
wealthier, and more likely to donate to charities than nationally representative
samples. Additionally, the majority of the sample (≈90%) feels favorably toward
human rights, humanitarian, and development NGOs.
6. Samples fromMechanical Turk are not nationally representative. However, because we targeted
our study at people who are willing to donate online, we are not overly concerned with these dis-
crepancies. Moreover, a growing body of research comparing Mechanical Turk with other sampling
services finds it generally commensurable—see the online appendix for a lengthier discussion about
this research.
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Experimental treatments and outcomes
We presented participants with a short paragraph with three manipulated frames,
each highlighting different factors that might influence patterns of private philan-
thropy: (1) crackdown/no crackdown, (2) humanitarian assistance/human rights,
and (3) government/private funding. We used the International Rescue Commit-
tee (IRC) as our example NGO because it fits within each possible frame and as
such, requires no respondent deception. IRC provides humanitarian assistance and
engages in human rights advocacy for refugees, more than a quarter of IRC’s in-
come comes from both government grants and private donations, and it works in
countries with and without anti-NGO laws.7 We use a 2×2×2 between-subject fac-
torial design with participants randomly assigned to one of eight versions of the
following vignette:
The International Rescue Committee (IRC) focuses on {humanitarian
assistance for refugees | human rights for refugees} {and works in coun-
tries that have recently passed laws that harshly restrict nonprofit orga-
nizations | NOTHING}. A substantial proportion of IRC’s funding comes
from {government | private} donors.
We measured two outcomes: (1) how likely participants would be to donate to
IRC (measured with a 5-point scale ranging from “Extremely likely” to “Extremely
unlikely”), and (2) how much participants would hypothetically donate to IRC if
they had an extra $100. Research finds that the factors driving donation willingness
and amounts differ depending on donor income, pro-social attitudes, self-image,
and other psychological benefits (Wiepking, 2007). Accordingly, our framing treat-
ments might differ across the two outcomes. We collapsed the likelihood scale into
a binary variable measuring whether the participant is likely (“Extremely likely”
and “Somewhat likely”) or not likely (all other responses) to donate.8 We also in-
cluded an exploratory free response question asking respondents to justify their
choice.
Each of the varied treatments correspond to our hypotheses: crackdown vs. no
crackdown, humanitarian assistance vs. human rights, and government vs. non-
governmental funding. Participants might misinterpret the vignette and assume
that IRC’s host governments fund the organization rather than its home govern-
ment. In either case, knowing about government funding should still serve as a
signal of the organization’s deservingness. Similarly, there could be confusion with
7. Some respondents may have been influenced by prior opinions of IRC. Randomization dis-
tributes this bias across the different conditions and likely lessens the threat to validity.
8. An ordered probit model in the online appendix shows that results are consistent when using
all five possible responses.
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phrase “private funding,” but since we use it as the opposite of government fund-
ing, it should still act as a heuristic. Free responses tend to confirm the correct
interpretation of the vignette, and many respondents explicitly justified their lack
of support for IRC because of government funding, as expected (“I see that a large
portion of its funding comes from government donors, so I feel it doesn’t need me
as much.”9)
Estimation
We test our first hypothesis by calculating the differences in the average likelihood
to donate and the average amount donated across the crackdown conditions. For
our second and third hypotheses we measure the difference in means spread across
both issue and funding conditions. For additional exploration of the effect of issue
and funding, we also measure the effect of crackdown within nested combinations
of issue and funding conditions.
We use two Bayesian models to estimate the effect of crackdown on the likeli-
hood of donating and the amount hypothetically donated. Wemodel the proportion
of respondents indicating they would likely donate as a binomial distribution:
𝑛group 1, group 2 ∼ Binomial(𝑛group total, 𝜃group) [likelihood]
Δ𝑛 = 𝑛group 2 − 𝑛group 1 [difference in proportions]
𝑛 ∶ Number likely to donate
𝜃group 1, group 2 ∼ Beta(5, 5) [prior prob. of likelihood]
We estimate the mean amount donated in each condition using a t distribution:
𝑥group 1, group 2 ∼ Student 𝑡(𝜈, 𝜇, 𝜎) [likelihood]
Δ𝑥 = 𝑥group 2 − 𝑥group 1 [difference in means]
𝑥 ∶ Mean amount donated
𝜈 ∼ Exponential(1/29) [prior normality]
𝜇group 1, group 2 ∼ 𝒩 ( ̄𝑥group 1, group 2, 10) [prior donation mean per group]
𝜎group 1, group 2 ∼ Cauchy(0, 1) [prior donation sd per group]
We use median values from the posterior distributions as point estimates and
calculate credible intervals using the 95% highest posterior density. We declare
an effect statistically significant if the posterior probability of being different from
zero exceeds 0.95. Because differences can be either positive or negative (i.e. in
some frames, the crackdown condition causes larger donations; in others it causes
smaller donations), we report the probability that the difference is not equal to zero:
9. Response 6216778.
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when themedian value is negative we report the proportion of predicted values that
are negative, and vice versa.
Results
Table 1 provides a summary of how our results map onto our hypotheses, both
individually and nested within each other.
Table 1: Summary of hypotheses and results
Hypothesis Expectation Results: Likelihood of donation
Results: Amount
donated
Crackdown ↑ No effect Increase
Humanitarian assistance ↑ No effect No effect
Government funding ↓ No effect No effect
Crackdown + issue area
Crackdown +
humanitarian assistance
↑ (crackdown) +
↑ (humanitarian)
Increase Increase
Crackdown +
human rights
↑ (crackdown) +
↓ (human rights)
No effect No effect
Crackdown + funding
Crackdown +
government funding
↑ (crackdown) +
↓ (government)
No effect No effect
Crackdown +
private funding
↑ (crackdown) +
↑ (private)
Increase Increase
Crackdown + issue + funding
Crackdown +
humanitarian assistance +
government funding
↑ (crackdown) +
↑ (humanitarian) +
↓ (government)
No effect Increase
Crackdown +
humanitarian assistance +
private funding
↑ (crackdown) +
↑ (humanitarian) +
↑ (private)
No effect No effect
Crackdown +
human rights +
government funding
↑ (crackdown) +
↓ (human rights) +
↓ (government)
Decrease Decrease
Crackdown +
human rights +
private funding
↑ (crackdown) +
↓ (human rights) +
↑ (private)
Increase Increase
Likelihood of donation
In isolation we find that respondents are not more likely to donate to legally be-
sieged INGOs (H1a). As seen in Figure 2(A), those exposed to the crackdown con-
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dition tend to have a slightly higher probability of donating (46.7%) than those
in the control condition (42.9%), but the difference is not significant (Δ = 3.8%;
𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.82). We find similar results when looking at the isolated effects of
issue area and funding. Both differences are positive, but the posterior probability
of being larger than zero is low (Δissue = 2.3%; 𝑝(Δissue ≠ 0) = 0.7; Δfunding = 2.9%;
𝑝(Δfunding ≠ 0) = 0.75). We thus do not initially find evidence that crackdowns (or
issue or funding) alone increase the likelihood of donating.
Table 2: Likelihood of donation and differences in proportions in “crackdown” (treatment) and “no
crackdown” (control) conditions; values represent posterior medians
H1a % likelyTreatment % likelyControl Δ %Δ 𝑝(Δ ≠ 0)
Crackdown − No crackdown 46.7% 42.9% 3.8% 8.9% 0.82
Humanitarian assistance − Human
rights
45.9% 43.7% 2.3% 5.4% 0.7
Private − Government funding 46.3% 43.4% 2.9% 6.8% 0.75
H2a and H3a %
likelyCrackdown
% likelyNo crackdown Δ %Δ 𝑝(Δ ≠ 0)
Human rights issues 44.3% 43.6% 0.6% 1.5% 0.54
Humanitarian assistance issues 49.4% 42.5% 6.8% 15.9% 0.88
Government funding 41.3% 45.8% -4.6% -10.0% 0.78
Private funding 52.4% 40.3% 12.1% 30.2% 0.98
H2a and H3a (nested) %
likelyCrackdown
% likelyNo crackdown Δ %Δ 𝑝(Δ ≠ 0)
Human rights issues, Government
funding
32.0% 47.4% -15.4% -32.5% 0.97
Human rights issues, Private funding 57.4% 40.4% 16.9% 41.5% 0.98
Humanitarian assistance issues,
Government funding
51.4% 44.7% 6.8% 15.2% 0.8
Humanitarian assistance issues,
Private funding
47.5% 41.2% 6.1% 14.8% 0.78
Figure 2(B–C) shows the difference in the likelihood of donation for both crack-
down conditions across NGO issue areas (H2a) and funding sources (H3a). Crack-
down has almost no effect on the likelihood of donating to human rights NGOs
(𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.54), which is not surprising, since people who donate to these kinds
of NGOs likely know that their work is challenging to host governments. We hy-
pothesized that the positive crackdown effect would be stronger for humanitarian
NGOs, and while crackdown does have a positive effect under the humanitarian
frame, the probability this difference is greater than zero is below our 95% thresh-
old (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.88).
We do find some evidence for H3a, however. Crackdown has little effect on
individual preferences to donate to NGOs receiving government funding (𝑝(Δ ≠
0) = 0.78), but it does increase the likelihood of donating to privately funded NGOs
by 30% (Δ = 12.1%; 𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.98). This is likely because a donor might feel
that their marginal donation wouldmake a difference. For instance, one respondent
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Private −
Government
funding
Humanitarian
assistance −
Human rights
Crackdown −
No crackdown
-10% 0% 10% 20%
Difference in donation likelihood
A
Human rights issues Humanitarian assistance issues
-20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30% -20% -10% 0% 10% 20% 30%
Crackdown −
No crackdown
B
Government funding Private funding
-20% 0% 20% -20% 0% 20%
Crackdown −
No crackdown
Difference in donation likelihood
C
Humanitarian assistance issues
Government funding
Humanitarian assistance issues
Private funding
Human rights issues
Government funding
Human rights issues
Private funding
-25% 0% 25% 50% -25% 0% 25% 50%
Crackdown −
No crackdown
Crackdown −
No crackdown
Difference in donation likelihood
Point shows posterior median; thick black lines show 80% credible interval;
thin black lines show 95% credible interval
D
Figure 2: Difference in likelihood of donation across crackdown and no crackdown groups, conditioned by other experimental
frames
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reasoned that since IRC “is already receiving funding from governments, so funding
from private individuals doesn’t seem as necessary. I’d prefer to give my money to
an organization that is primarily run by private donations.”10
While the crackdown frame has no effect on the probability of donating to hu-
man rights NGOs alone, conditioning this finding on the source of NGO funding
reveals competing trends. Figure 2(D) shows the difference in donation likelihood
across all experimental conditions. When donors know that a human rights orga-
nization is primarily government-funded, they are substantially less likely to do-
nate if the organization faces government crackdown abroad. This follows our
expected hypotheses for both issue area and funding (Δ = −15.4%; 𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) =
0.97). This finding possibly reflects donor suspicion about the mission and goals of
government-funded human rights programming. For instance, one respondent in
the government and human rights conditions explained that they did not donate
because “government donors might have interests that actually hurt refugees, and
are donating to have some sway in the organization”11
In contrast, when donors know that a human rights organization is privately
funded, they are more likely to donate when there is a legal crackdown than when
the NGO faces no legal hurdles (Δ = 16.9%; 𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.98). As explained previ-
ously, each of the heuristics on their own influence the propensity to donate, but
we do not yet know how the interaction between heuristics affects donor behavior.
Here, the private funding heuristic appears to override the dampening in likelihood
that should come from focusing on more contentious human rights issues. For hu-
manitarian assistance NGOs, however, legal crackdowns do not have a significant
effect on the likelihood of donation when nesting either funding or issue frames—
neither of the nested experimental frames play a heuristic role.
These results give partial support to H3a. The source of funding has little influ-
ence on the preference to donate to humanitarian NGOs, but on average, donors are
substantially more likely to want to give to privately funded human rights NGOs
than government-funded organizations. Additionally donors appear to both punish
government-funded human rights NGOs facing crackdown and rally behind pri-
vately funded NGOs facing those same hurdles. For instance, one respondent who
was presented with a government-funded human rights version of IRC explained
that “I’m not exactly sure what they did was right or wrong, I think it just seems
bad, so I’m less likely to want to donate to them.”12 Other respondents showed
increased support when presented with a privately-funded version of IRC, explain-
ing that they would donate a substantial amount because “[t]hey [IRC] are doing
10. Response 6486084.
11. Response 2560169.
12. Response 8425616.
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good work in countries where it is tough for groups like them to operate and they
need all the help they can get.”13 Individual donors thus seem to be more willing
to support besieged human rights organizations when they are unencumbered by
government funds.
Amount donated
On their own, crackdowns do not substantially influence donors’ likelihood to do-
nate, but they do increase the amount of money that respondents are willing to
contribute (see Figure 3(A)). Informing participants that IRC faces legal hurdles
abroad increased donations by $3.39 on average, a 26% increase from the no crack-
down condition (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.97). This provides good evidence for H1b—donors
appear to give more money to besieged INGOs. In contrast, neither issue area
nor funding on their own have an effect on the amount donated (Δissue = −0.78;
𝑝(Δissue ≠ 0) = 0.66; Δfunding = 1.44; 𝑝(Δfunding ≠ 0) = 0.78).
Table 3: Mean values and differences inmeans for amount donated in “crackdown” (treatment) and
“no crackdown” (control) conditions; values represent posterior medians
H1b AmountTreatment AmountControl Δ %Δ 𝑝(Δ ≠ 0)
Crackdown − No crackdown 16.35 12.96 3.39 26.3% 0.97
Humanitarian assistance − Human
rights
14.01 14.84 -0.78 -5.3% 0.66
Private − Government funding 15.11 13.65 1.44 10.6% 0.78
H2b and H3b AmountCrackdown AmountNo crackdown Δ %Δ 𝑝(Δ ≠ 0)
Human rights issues 17.43 14.94 2.49 16.8% 0.83
Humanitarian assistance issues 16.01 11.74 4.27 36.5% 0.96
Government funding 13.87 12.26 1.64 13.5% 0.74
Private funding 18.97 14.33 4.55 31.6% 0.96
H2b and H3b (nested) AmountCrackdown AmountNo crackdown Δ %Δ 𝑝(Δ ≠ 0)
Human rights issues, Government
funding
10.55 15.04 -4.49 -29.9% 0.9
Human rights issues, Private funding 23.71 14.5 9.09 62.7% 0.99
Humanitarian assistance issues,
Government funding
21.42 11.97 9.18 76.4% 0.99
Humanitarian assistance issues,
Private funding
15.73 15.79 -0.03 -0.2% 0.5
This trend also holds when nesting crackdown within NGO issue area. The
crackdown condition elicits higher donations for both the human rights and hu-
manitarian NGOs, though with varying levels of significance (see Figure 3(B–C)).
Emphasizing legal crackdown increases donations to human rights NGOs by $2.49,
but with a lower probability of significance (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.83). In contrast, crack-
downs boost donations to humanitarian NGOs by $4.27, a 37% increase beyond the
control condition (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.96). We thus find support for H2b: donors give
13. Response 3025921.
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Figure 3: Difference in amountdonatedacross crackdownandnocrackdowngroups, conditionedbyother experimental frames
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more to besieged humanitarian NGOs. We also find evidence for H3b. Donors give
$4.55 more (a 32% increase) to legally besieged NGOs that are privately funded, as
hypothesized, (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.96). However, the crackdown condition has little ef-
fect on the amount donated to government-funded NGOs (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.74). This
is possibly because the effects cancel each other out—legal crackdowns should in-
crease the amount donated, but reliance on government funding dissuades donors
from giving, as predicted by the literature showing that governments can crowd
out private funding.
Combining issue areas and funding sources provides more texture. We pre-
viously found that donors are less likely to donate to government-funded human
rights NGOs and more likely to donate to privately funded human rights NGOs
when they face legal issues. These trends also apply to preferences in the amount
donors donate. Respondents were willing to donate $9.09 more to besieged pri-
vately funded human rights NGOs compared to the no crackdown control condi-
tion (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.99), increasing their donations by 63%. Respondents explained
that they chose to give additional money to privately funded human rights NGOs
precisely because “the country limits non-profits.”14 The punishment mechanism
found previously does not translate to the amount donated—while there is a de-
crease of $4.49 in average donations to government-funded human rights NGOs
facing crackdown, the chance this difference is less than zero is lower than our
threshold (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.9).
Emphasizing legal difficulties increased donations to government-funded hu-
manitarian NGOs by 76%, or $9.18 (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.99). The crackdown condition
causes this increase despite some hesitation from respondents who often indicated
that government-funded NGOs do not deserve private donations. Many respon-
dents in the crackdown condition argued that “[m]y tax paying dollars go to the
government and if the government is helping to fund it then they are in turn getting
some of my money.”15 This hesitation is not universal, however, and in aggregate
most respondents chose to give substantially more. Many echoed this respondent,
who identified the crackdown condition as one of the reasons for giving the full
hypothetical $100: “If they can function without being affected by the harsh laws
against non-profits, I would want them to have as much help as possible to do
their humanitarian work.”16 Thus, legal crackdowns can increase individual donor
urgency to support an organization, and this heuristic is potentially processed dif-
ferently compared to other organization-level heuristics or information from social
networks.
14. Response 13685.
15. Response 9509936.
16. Response 1097165.
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In contrast, crackdowns have no substantial effect on the amount donated to
privately funded humanitarian NGOs (𝑝(Δ ≠ 0) = 0.5). No respondent in these
conditions mentioned funding sources in their justification, and many explained
that theywould not give solely because of the crackdown and that they “would keep
all $100 because it would not even go to helping humanitarian efforts due to the
new laws.”17 It is thus possible that donors see government-funded humanitarian
NGOs as more legitimate and more capable of handling difficult legal restrictions
than privately funded organizations. Donors might assume that an NGO that re-
ceives government funding would have support from the home government when
facing legal challenges, while an NGO funded by small donors would be less able
to confront such challenges. Further research is needed to probe this trend.
Discussion: Can these preferences translate to behavior?
While the survey experiment allows us to hold the organization constant and test
for specific hypotheses, there are a few caveats to consider when interpreting these
results and applying them to nonprofit fundraising. This is because the experi-
ment measures preferences (willingness to donate) rather than behavior (actual
donations). However, there is evidence that individuals’ willingness to donate (as
measured in the experiment) translates well into behavior. The wording of the
survey experiment uses an informational frame, where the focus is on educating
respondents. This is in stark contrast to the use of personal frames, which draw the
audience’s attention to the plight of an individual, or motivational frames, which
are meant to motivate individuals to act by creating feels of agency and efficacy.18
Prior research has shown that informational frames are the most important frames
in generating donations (McEntire et al., 2015).
Moreover, informational frames are a necessary precondition for encouraging
action in human rights nonprofit campaigns, and individuals are more likely to do-
nate when informational frames are combined with personal frames (McEntire et
al., 2015). Our experiment shows a substantial increase in donors’ willingness to do-
nate to human rights groups facing crackdown, especially those that are privately-
funded, and this result emerges from the use of only informational frames. If orga-
nizations combined with information with personal frames, research suggests these
donations may further increase.
It is also worth noting that there is evidence, at least domestically, that restric-
tions on nonprofit activities spur changes in private donors’ giving patterns. For in-
17. Response 8995923.
18. Personal frames humanize victims and entice action by invoking an emotional reaction. Prior
research finds that people are more be generous when donating to a campaign with a single victim,
rather than a statistical group of victims (Slovic, 2007).
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stance, after Texas and other states pledged to impose new restrictions on Planned
Parenthood following the 2016 election, donations to the organization increased
more than 40 times the usual amount (Cooney, 2016). Thus, donor preferences of
increased generosity towards legally besieged groups abroad also has some domes-
tic parallels.
Conclusion
In the era of closing civic space, dozens of countries restricted international NGO
funding and programming. With the consequent withdrawal of official govern-
mental aid, many INGOs have turned to foreign individual donors as an additional
funding source. Since seeking out perfect information about a nonprofit and its
activities—especially international programming—is costly and time-consuming,
donors use heuristics when deciding which organizations to support. In this pa-
per, we argue that informational heuristics about NGOs’ legal environments and
organizational-level attributes can influence donor preferences for international
giving.
Using a survey experiment with respondents in the U.S., we find that the domes-
tic political environments of INGO host countries can serve as one such signal. Our
results show that while crackdowns do not consistently influence individual pref-
erences of donation on their own, respondents indicated willingness to donate 26%
more to legally restricted NGOs. This effect persists when mediated by other or-
ganizational heuristics, with respondents giving 37% more to humanitarian NGOs,
and 63% more to privately funded human rights NGOs.
This article should be viewed as an exploratory study. While the survey exper-
iment allows us to hold the organization constant and test for specific hypotheses,
there are limits to its external validity. Our sample captures people who are rela-
tively more likely to donate to charities and thus does not reflect the general U.S.
population. Our findings do not apply to the total population—we still know very
little about how anti-NGO crackdowns change perceptions of nonprofits in general.
Future research should test the generalizability of our findings to individual
donors in other countries, as well as determine the extent to which these pref-
erences translate into behavior. For instance, the nonprofit sector in the U.S. relies
more heavily on government funding than in Europe. In the latter, large organiza-
tions like Amnesty International and Médecins Sans Frontières receive very little
support from their home governments (Stroup, 2012). This may imply that donors
in European countries will have different preferences when choosing to donate
to government and privately-funded organizations. Future research should also
look more narrowly at donors who regularly give to international causes, as these
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individuals are likely more aware of political trends in the countries where their
preferred organizations work.
Because our sample reflects those who are already willing to donate to char-
ities, these results have important implications for nonprofit fundraising. NGOs
may benefit from publicizing when they are targets of government crackdown and
including that information in their framing appeals. While this may not be enough
to sway the average U.S. donor, our results show that communicating this informa-
tion can convince already-likely donors to donatemore to besieged groups. Further,
if NGOs signal to donors that they receive a majority of their funding from private
sources, they may be able to convince individual donors that their contributions
might help the NGO resist the crackdown.
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